How Many Large Cities Controlled By The Democrats

Since at least the 2000 presidential election, pundits, scholars, and the general public take conceptualized the state's partisan landscape using the blueish states, carmine states, and swing states framework. Just despite its ubiquity, this construction ignores how intrastate regional tensions and political contest imbue the divisions betwixt cherry-red and blue America. Differences within states also anchor the long-standing urban-rural dissever—a salient feature of American politics since the country's founding.

Last twelvemonth, the Brookings Institution Press published our book, Blue Metros, Red States: The Shifting Urban-Rural Separate in America'southward Swing States. Nosotros argue that motility toward the Democratic Party in rapidly urbanizing suburbs is shifting America'due south partisan mistake line from a long-standing urban-rural divide to an emerging split betwixt metro areas and the balance of country. The book covered xiii swing states that had a 2016 presidential race margin of ten points or less and comprise at least one metropolitan expanse exceeding 1 million residents.¹

Within-state splits derive from four interrelated influences. First are sociocultural factors ofttimes determined past initial settlement patterns and that shape values and attitudes related to diverseness acceptance. Next is demographic and economic sorting that concentrates multifariousness and economic productivity in the country'southward largest metro areas. There are besides abrupt attitudinal differences due to rising negative partisanship and the growing saliency of cultural, racial, and other diversity-related issues. The attitudinal differences too have implications for perceptions of status loss, particularly amidst white residents. Finally, institutions such as the U.S. Senate and the Electoral College; policies and processes such as redistricting, abode rule, and preemption; and metro area fragmentation often disadvantage urban and suburban interests.

The end result, equally journalist Ron Brownstein noted afterwards the 2016 ballot, has been a decoupling of demographic and economic power from political power.² Blue Metros, Reddish States placed these tensions in a common geographic framework—the 1000000-plus population metro area compared to the rest of a state's population—and considered how these economic and demographic powerhouses navigate their land'southward often hostile political terrains. Past focusing our analysis on swing states, we examine these dynamics in contexts that determine the partisan balance of power at the federal level.

In this brief, nosotros assess how well the book's main hypotheses fared in the 2020 presidential and the 2021 Georgia U.S. Senate runoff elections. We observe that the elections accelerated the trends we identified. Indeed, while it has long been the example that density and diversity predict Democratic back up,³ the results propose that another "D" tin can be added to that precept: degrees. Democrats' increasing support amid higher-educated voters helped the party push farther into the suburbs—especially those that are diverse, urban, and well educated. In the election's aftermath, the role of density and the exodus of college-educated suburbanites from the GOP has received significant attention.^four The same can exist said for the migration of Democratic-leaning voters from places such as California into red state major metro areas (such equally Austin, Texas) and the bear on the new residents take on statewide election outcomes.⁵

Within-state geographic shifts are meaning given that in many swing states, the metro surface area vote share is and so large that if the Democrats win enough urban and suburban voters, Republicans cannot count on enough exurban and rural voters to win statewide elections. As such patterns strengthen over successive ballot cycles, the urban-rural divide that for generations nourished Republican majorities will be eclipsed by a divide between major metropolitan areas and the remainder of the state—an emerging dynamic that favors Democrats.

A dissimilarity exists between Sun Chugalug swing states, where the new pattern is ascendant, and Rust Belt swing states, where the components of the emerging Democratic coalition are less prevalent due to fewer various and college-educated voters. To prevail in the Rust Chugalug, Democratic candidates must cut Republicans' margins in smaller cities and rural communities, while running up large wins in the 1000000-plus population metro areas.

In 2016, Hillary Clinton was unable to patch together enough Rust Belt and Sun Belt states to secure an Electoral College victory. Four years subsequently, Joe Biden successfully did and then. Clinton was trapped between a weakening Rust Belt "blue wall," and the even so-to-emerge Sunday Belt blue states.⁶ Biden'southward coalition, on the other mitt, secured the blue wall in the Midwest while adding 2 Democratic-trending, fast-urbanizing Sun Chugalug swing states: Arizona and Georgia.

Metro surface area swings betwixt the 2016 and 2020 elections

The analyses below summarize shifts in the 2020 presidential vote compared with 2016. The main unit of assay is metro areas with a population over ane million. We define metro areas using the census-designated metropolitan statistical area (MSA)⁷ and with the exception of Northern Virginia, refer to the MSA using the leading chief city instead of the formal MSA title.⁸ For each of the xiii swing states, data was collected from secretary of state websites after ballot results were certified. The data was aggregated for the counties in each of the 27 meg-plus population metro areas in these states to generate the partisan voter margin. We also use the data to measure each metro area's share of the full land vote. Data for counties that are not part of the metro areas was aggregated to generate the "residue-of-state" mensurate.

Tabular array ane summarizes the partisan margin for the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections in 27 swing-state metro areas and the inter-election shift in partisan back up and change in vote share. Metro areas are grouped in terms of state and region using a Sun Belt/Rust Chugalug framework. For Sun Belt states, we grouping Florida and Texas together equally "Large Sun Chugalug" states due to their large calibration and the fact that each contains four metro areas with populations over 1 million. Eastern (Georgia, N Carolina, and Virginia) and western (Arizona, Colorado, and Nevada) "New Lord's day Belt" states also are clustered together. Table one further groups the "Rust Belt Eastward" (Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) and "Rust Belt Central" (Minnesota and Wisconsin) states. Figure one uses data from the "difference" column in Table one and orders the 27 metro areas past their inter-election partisan shift from most Republican to almost Democratic.

Among the xiii states, Florida clearly bucked the expectations of our Blue Metros, Red States thesis. While Biden'due south margin did increase relative to Clinton'south in Orlando and Tampa, these improvements were beginning by President Donald Trump'southward surge in Miami, delivering him the Sunshine State'due south 29 electoral votes by a greater margin compared to 2016. The upshot in Jacksonville was also a surprise; we predicted that it was poised to movement toward Democrats, and in so doing, nudge Florida blue. While Biden narrowly won Duval Canton, including the metropolis of Jacksonville (where Trump won in 2016), Republicans carried the metro area due to overwhelming back up in surrounding suburban counties. Consequently, Jacksonville had the 2nd-largest swing to Republicans among the 27 metro areas, post-obit Miami (see Figure 1). Among Florida'southward other million-plus population metros, only Orlando's share of the state vote increased relative to 2016—pregnant that Biden's stronger performance in Orlando provided a crash-land in Democratic back up compared to Clinton.

Texas provides the clearest example of our thesis. In 2016, Clinton but won Austin, while in 2020 Biden carried all 4 of the Lone Star State's 1000000-plus population metro areas. He picked up nearly 8 points in Austin and Dallas-Fort Worth, while making minor gains in Houston and San Antonio.

As detailed in Figure 1, Biden's improvements in Austin and Dallas-Fort Worth were the largest metro surface area swings for Democrats in 2020. Moreover, Biden's surge in Texas'south one thousand thousand-plus population metro areas carried even more than punch given that the total vote shares increased in each. But fifty-fifty though Democrats cut Republicans' margin from 16 percentage points to less than 6 over the class of the final 2 presidential elections, Biden vicious brusk of winning the state, which we speculated was possible, but unlikely. Heavily Latino- or Hispanic-populated counties along the Mexican edge—long a Democratic stronghold—saw Biden'due south margins reject sharply compared with Clinton in 2016. Had the border county margins held steady, Biden would take lost Texas by perchance less than four percentage points. If Texas eventually moves to the Autonomous column, then the GOP'south path to 270 electoral votes narrows significantly, particularly given that Texas (similar Florida) is poised to proceeds multiple electoral votes afterward the 2020 census-based reapportionment.

Among the three "New Sun Belt East" states, Biden further strengthened the Democrats' hold on Virginia due to an even stronger showing in its three metro areas with populations over i meg—2 of which (Northern Virginia and Richmond) as well gained in statewide vote share. Biden'southward win is the party's fourth consecutive presidential election victory in the state, a string that was final achieved past Democrats in the 1930s and 1940s, when Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman carried Virginia five times in a row. In North Carolina, Biden cutting Trump's 2016 margin by almost 2.v percentage points, only nevertheless narrowly lost the state. Biden's improved performance was driven by 5-point increases in the land's two metro areas with populations over 1 million (Charlotte and Raleigh), each of which accounted for a larger share of the total vote compared to 2016.

Georgia is one of the 5 states that Biden flipped. Democrats nearly doubled the party's margin in metro area Atlanta—the tertiary-largest Democratic proceeds (see Figure 1) among the 27 million-plus population metro areas in the 13 swing states. In total, the party improved its performance by 5.v percentage points, making Biden the commencement Autonomous presidential candidate to win Georgia since Beak Clinton in 1992. Biden's support in Atlanta was even more potent due to the increase in the metro expanse's vote share relative to 2016. Georgia is on track to add an balloter vote this twelvemonth, driven almost entirely by population growth in the booming Atlanta metropolitan surface area.

Farther west, Biden won all three of the "New Sun Belt West" states and became the first Autonomous presidential candidate to win Arizona since 1996, when Bill Clinton carried the state with a plurality of the vote. Biden's Arizona victory was highlighted past 5-indicate swings in the Phoenix and Tucson metro areas, as well as nearly doubling the raw vote advantage in Coconino Canton (home to Flagstaff) and improving upon Clinton's margin in Apache County (including the Navajo and Hopi Native American reservations). Winning metro surface area Phoenix was even more than significant given its increased vote share and the fact that more than liberal Tucson'due south statewide vote share decreased. Similar Georgia, Arizona is due some other electoral vote after reapportionment. And, every bit with Atlanta, most of the state's population increase occurred in metro area Phoenix.

Biden more than than doubled the Autonomous margin in Colorado due in large office to a nearly half dozen-betoken swing in metro surface area Denver. Like Virginia (which also features loftier shares of college-educated voters and growing diversity), Colorado's status as a swing state appears to be waning given the pace at which the Democrats are consolidating their support. And, once again, Colorado will gain an balloter vote based mostly on suburban growth around Denver.

Despite favorable demography and strong Autonomous showings in contempo elections, Biden'south margin of victory in Nevada replicated Clinton's. This inter-ballot stability is even more than surprising given that Biden lost ground in Las Vegas, the country's large blueish metro area. Biden's stronger showing in the state's rural counties and in Washoe Canton (home to Reno) offset the increment in Trump's Las Vegas support, even as its share of the vote increased by 1 percentage point. Las Vegas has both density and diversity but lacks degrees, thus declining to hitting on all cylinders that drive Democratic gains.

Biden carried all of 2020'south Rust Belt swing states except Ohio, the but swing state likewise Florida where Trump's margin improved compared to 2016. Among the three "Rust Belt East" states, Biden made pocket-sized gains in the Detroit and Philadelphia metropolitan areas and larger gains in Grand Rapids and Pittsburgh on his mode to flipping both Michigan and Pennsylvania. Trump won Ohio even though he lost support in two of the state'due south 3 metro areas with populations over i 1000000. Trump did perform meliorate in Cleveland, merely the metro area's vote share decreased compared to 2016. Biden returned Wisconsin to the Democratic column due to increased support in Milwaukee and the smaller, but still relatively large and heavily Democratic Madison metropolitan surface area.

Although the Trump campaign targeted Minnesota after narrowly losing the state in 2016, the entrada'south efforts were to no avail. Biden won Minnesota by nearly 6 pct points and boosted the Autonomous margin in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metropolitan surface area by nearly vii points as turnout in the Twin Cities surged.

To put the inter-election data in context, Effigy two compares the Democratic metro area margins against the Democratic margins in the balance of the state (all counties outside of one thousand thousand-plus population metro areas) and the state margin. Positive values indicate a Clinton or Biden advantage, while negative values signal a Trump advantage. For states with multiple million-plus population metro areas, the "Metro" values combine the data for all such metro areas.

The 2020 and 2016 presidential ballot data demonstrates the degree to which Democratic victories in the 13 swing states depend upon the largest metropolitan areas, and just how much these regions' partisan back up differs from the balance of their land. In four of the five states that Biden flipped (Pennsylvania being the exception), his aggregate support increase in the million-plus population metro areas exceeded the statewide margin. Equally important, though, is the fact that Biden cutting into Trump's voter margins outside of the states' largest metropolitan areas. While the shift was i point or less in Arizona and Wisconsin, Biden's "remainder-of-state" gains equaled or exceeded ii points in Georgia and Michigan, and were more than than 2.five points in Pennsylvania—roughly twice equally large as his million-plus population metro surface area percentage indicate gains. Only in Ohio and Texas did Trump's margin improve outside of those states' largest metropolitan areas.

In sum, while outsized support in million-plus population metro areas powers Democratic vote totals, the party's candidates also demand pockets of support in smaller cities and towns to button them over the top in statewide races. Every bit we item in Blue Metros, Ruddy States, where these votes come from reflects the uniqueness of each state'due south political, demographic, and economic mural. For instance, in Minnesota and Wisconsin, the Twin Ports region on Lake Superior continues to deliver Autonomous majorities. In Arizona, stiff support among Native Americans in the northern part of the state was critical to flipping it blue, while high-assiduities resort towns in the Rockies fortified Democratic support in Denver to evangelize Colorado for the party. Biden'due south victory in Pennsylvania—largely regarded as the 2020 "tipping point" state—was aided not just by swings in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, simply by squeezing out majorities in Lackawanna County (dwelling to Scranton) in the due east and Erie County in the w.

Georgia delivers the U.S. Senate for Democrats

Coming just nine weeks after the presidential ballot, the runoff elections to fill Georgia's 2 U.S. Senate seats provide another opportunity to evaluate the partisan difference between metro expanse Atlanta and the balance of Georgia. To facilitate these comparisons, the data presented in Table 2 reports the margin of victory for the land, the Atlanta metropolitan area, and the residuum of Georgia, too as the share of the vote that was bandage in metro area Atlanta and the residual of state for the November presidential and January Senate contests.

While participation in the runoff elections approached ninety% of the turnout of the full general election, the driblet-off was greater outside of Atlanta. As a result, metro expanse Atlanta's share of the vote increased past just over a half a percentage point, as turnout in some Trump strongholds declined. Democratic candidates Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock won by larger margins than Biden, fifty-fifty though both candidates' vote shares in Atlanta decreased. Ossoff and Warnock improved their showings exterior of Atlanta relative to Biden by making small but consequent gains in vote share in the counties that contain Georgia's smaller cities, including Augusta (Richmond County), Columbus (Muscogee County), Macon (Bibb County), and Savannah (Chatham County). Still, without double-digit margins in the Atlanta metropolitan area, neither Democratic candidate would accept won and secured the party's narrow majority in the U.South. Senate.

This data too suggests the degree to which turnout among some rural voters may exist dependent upon Trump'due south presence on the ballot. Akin to the 2018 midterm elections—when Democrats gained control of the U.Due south. House of Representatives, flipped 2 Senate seats, and picked up seven governorships—without Trump atop the ticket, some of his supporters stayed home. For Republicans contemplating if the political party should double downward on Trumpian-manner populism or work to win back voters who moved toward Democrats in the past four years, turnout patterns in 2018 and in the Georgia runoff elections should be front and center in these conversations.

A new dynamic emerges for statewide elections

In 2016, Hillary Clinton cut Republicans' margins in Arizona and Georgia, but she was unable to movement both states' electoral votes into the Autonomous column. At the time, Republicans held all iv Senate seats in Arizona and Georgia. Four years later on, Biden won both states, and Democrats concord their Senate seats. Democrats also gained Senate seats in two other Sunday Belt states—Nevada (2018) and Colorado (2020)—both of which have been carried by the party in the last four presidential elections.

Equally of 2020, Democrats hold all U.S. Senate seats in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Nevada. In contrast, among the three Rust Belt seats that flipped dorsum to the Democrats in 2020, only Michigan is represented by ii Democratic senators.^ix

Biden would have won the presidency without taking Arizona and Georgia. Yet, without the inroads Democrats have made in the Sunday Belt during Trump'south presidency, Republicans would have maintained majority control of the Senate. Indeed, fifty-fifty with a internet gain of six Sun Chugalug Senate seats since 2016, the Autonomous majority rests on Vice President Kamala Harris's authority to break necktie votes.

Every bit we argue in Blue Metros, Red States, the outcomes in Arizona and Georgia are consistent with the emergence of a pan-metro-area identity anchored by a single big, dense, and more politically cohesive metro space. The same level of metro surface area cohesion does not exist in Florida or Texas (each with iv metro areas with populations over one one thousand thousand), or North Carolina, where us metro areas—Charlotte, Raleigh, and the Piedmont Triad—are splintered across a almost 200-mile swath forth I-85.

In fact, amid the 13 states in our analysis, Biden won the five states—Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Nevada, and Minnesota—where a single metro surface area constitutes over half of the state population. This also goes for bluish states such as Illinois, New York, Oregon, and Washington.

In 2016, Clinton won every state in the conterminous United States where a single metropolitan surface area deemed for more than half the state'due south full population—the only exceptions being Arizona and Georgia. In 2020, Biden swept all such states. In Blue Metros, Red States, we predicted that swing states with a major metro area exceeding half the total population were more than likely to vote Democratic than states with more divided urban systems such as Florida, North Carolina, and Texas. The 2020 ballot validated our point, with deep ramifications for future statewide elections as the urban-rural divide that anchored many Republican victories gives way to a metro area/rest-of-land dynamic more favorable to Democrats.